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2 
Midwestern Urban and 





Midwestern industrial cities continue to cede ground to low-cost, 
overseas competitors in the increasingly global economy. Yet tran-
sitions present opportunities and Rust Belt regions can experience 
prosperity despite losing the market dominance in manufacturing 
that they once enjoyed.
Human urban and regional settlements have existed within a sys-
tem of economic expansion and contraction that may be traced back 
continuously at least to the development of Afro-Eurasian interregional 
trade in the Bronze Age (Frank and Thompson 2005; Smith 2009). The 
characteristic structure and cycles of this system have included core-
periphery divisions of labor, alternating periods of rivalry and hege-
mony, and economic periods of upswing and downswing. The charac-
teristics of the total system at any given time have strongly infl uenced 
local economic activities and overall levels of prosperity (Frank 1993).
Today’s midwestern industrial cities are in some ways similar to 
other cities throughout history. Their local economies are parts of a 
larger, continuous system of economic expansion and contraction. They 
are driven by forces of innovation and entrepreneurship, capital accu-
mulation, division and specialization of labor, and changes in demand 
and market sizes. Yet they are somewhat different from many other cit-
ies in that they originated roughly during the latter part of the industrial 
revolution and came to economic preeminence during the fi rst half of the 
twentieth century, at which time the population not only in the United 
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States but in the world was larger than ever. These cities developed 
when transportation and communication technologies were advancing 
to previously unimaginable power and infl uence. Today, midwestern 
industrial cities face a new economic world order, with more competi-
tion from around the globe than ever before (Bair 2005; Ducruet and 
Notteboom 2012; Gereffi , Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005; Henderson 
and Nadvi 2011; Henderson et al. 2002; Winters and Yusuf 2007).
To understand any system, one must understand the larger one within 
which it is embedded. Thus, this chapter starts with a brief overview of 
the evolution of the economic world system within which midwestern 
industrial cities attained world-scale economic dominance in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This gives perspective on why 
these cities achieved such preeminence, and helps provide insight as 
to why they cannot reasonably expect to reclaim it today. Next, the 
chapter briefl y reviews some recent scholarly literature describing the 
technological, industrial, and political-economic changes during the 
early twenty-fi rst century. These shifts seem likely to continue and pos-
sibly even to accelerate the long-term evolutionary trends from smaller-
scale, simpler sociotechnical and trade systems to larger-scale and more 
complex ones. The chapter then considers some of the implications of 
these trends for the renewal of prosperity in midwestern industrial cit-
ies. We conclude by suggesting that the idea of prosperity needs to be 
reframed relative to the previous concept, which was centered on eco-
nomic world dominance. However, on the basis of the reframed idea, 
renewed prosperity is well within reach for large segments of the popu-
lation in midwestern industrial cities. 
MIDWESTERN INDUSTRIAL CITIES WITHIN THE 
ECONOMIC WORLD ORDER THROUGH THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY
Trade and investment across borders began long before the rise of 
modern capitalism (Muller 2009). However, there is little doubt that 
global economic transition intensifi ed during and after the Industrial 
Revolution (More 2000). Some of the major underlying factors included 
the use of fossil fuels, the development of textile technology, the factory 
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system, the growth of the human population and its concentration in 
urban areas, and the modernization of agricultural, mining, and metal-
lurgical production processes. Other factors driving intensifi cation and 
diffusion included the expansion of transportation through newly cre-
ated and developed railroads, canals, macadamized roads, steamships, 
and refrigerated railway cars. Much was also promoted institutionally 
by radically reduced tariffs, designed to induce international trade, and 
the practice of pegging national currencies to gold, so as to have a com-
mon unit of exchange, especially in Europe.
Industrial Growth in the Midwest
As the Industrial Revolution diffused from Great Britain and Europe 
to the United States, midwestern cities were well-poised to take advan-
tage of the newly developed methods of production. By the turn of the 
twentieth century, advantageous locations along prominent waterways, 
agricultural surplus, abundant and fertile land, availability of natural 
resources, and high levels of immigration resulted in fl ourishing manu-
facturing sectors throughout midwestern industrial cities and helped 
catapult them to the fi rst rank of worldwide competitiveness. This dom-
inance was achieved through mass production driven by fossil fuels, 
blue-collar labor forces and mechanization, and national consumption 
of goods at historically unprecedented rates, allowing relatively large 
segments of the populations within midwestern industrial cities to enjoy 
great prosperity. 
These cities continued to grow through the early twentieth century, 
along with the entire American economy, arguably because of previ-
ously unparalleled opportunities to achieve scale economies offered by 
the exceptionally large U.S. domestic market (Hannah 2008). Between 
1900 and 1920, the U.S. population increased 40 percent, from 76.1 to 
106.5 million, while real gross domestic product rose 63 percent, from 
$422.8 to $687.7 billion.1 Midwestern industrial cities thrived primarily 
on trade with other U.S. markets, taking advantage of railroads, water-
ways, and Great Lakes shipping routes. Furthermore, labor needs con-
tinued to be met through great international in-migratory fl ows, all but 
guaranteeing continued economic growth and development. 
The period between World War I and World War II brought further 
ascendency of midwestern industrial cities. Partially this was attribut-
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able to events in other parts of the world with respect to which nobody 
in these U.S. cities had much if any control. Russia became the Soviet 
Union and closed itself off economically from competing with the rest 
of the world. Similarly, amidst the turmoil of the Weimar Republic’s 
efforts to recover from the devastation of World War I, the Germans 
sought complete economic self-reliance. At least partially in conse-
quence of the rapidly diffusing European retreat from international
trade along with the stock market crash of 1929, widespread bank 
failures, and a precipitous decrease in demand for manufactured and 
other products, the world economy went into a deep depression in the 
1930s. The closing of national borders to international trade contrib-
uted to mass unemployment, social upheaval, and the rise of fascism, 
all of which laid the foundation for World War II. The Great Depres-
sion induced widespread protectionism in an effort to shore up national 
economies around the world. For example, in the United States, the 
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 was signed into law on June 17, 1930, 
with the purpose of raising U.S. tariffs to record levels on over 20,000 
imported goods. U.S. markets were generally large enough to consume 
the products coming out of midwestern industrial cities, and the wide-
spread retreat from international trade reduced supplier competition for 
such products, indirectly contributing to the success of these cities. 
At the end of World War II, the standing of midwestern industrial 
cities was nearing its peak. At the same time, American policymakers 
and most global leaders were convinced that the protectionist policies 
and trade policies in place after the First World War were an economic 
disaster and tended to result in antagonism and confl ict. This led to 
efforts, spearheaded by the United States, to begin laying the institu-
tional groundwork necessary for expanding international trade (e.g., 
lower U.S. tariffs). The results of these initiatives were manifold: the 
World Bank was created to help fund infrastructure in war-ravaged 
Europe; the International Monetary Fund took on the task of stabilizing 
the currencies of troubled economies; and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established to reduce trade barriers and 
provide a forum for discussion of further reductions.2 
While the United States and most European countries were work-
ing to bolster international trade, the communist countries, led by the 
Soviet Union and China, remained inwardly focused and did not partic-
ipate. The centrally planned and controlled Soviet government’s policy 
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was to ensure that the bulk of the country’s production was traded and 
consumed exclusively within the Eastern European block of commu-
nist countries. International trade by the Chinese was largely precluded, 
not only by communist economic policies of centralized control, but 
because of the protracted civil war they had fought since the 1920s and 
the subsequent confl ict with the Japanese during World War II. China 
had very little industry, high unemployment, and massive food short-
ages. In the United States in general and midwestern industrial cities in 
particular, widespread fear of communism stimulated industrial produc-
tion for the manufactured goods and services needed to support the Cold 
War. The infl uence of communism also had the largely salutary indirect 
effect that communist countries did not provide supply-side economic 
competition for the goods produced by midwestern manufacturers. 
The Impact of Globalization 
Communism notwithstanding, the period between the 1950s and 
the 1970s brought an enormous overall increase in international trade. 
Perhaps most importantly, it was at this time that Japan and the “East-
Asian Tigers”—Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea—
began large-scale export-oriented industrialization. The rise of indus-
trial production, especially in the Far East, created new competition for 
midwestern industry in downstream markets for fi nished goods. Japa-
nese production, in particular, began to compete seriously in the United 
States, at fi rst with small, inexpensive trinkets, toys, and baubles of low 
quality, and later with high-quality motorcycles and vehicles such as 
automobiles, as well as offi ce machinery, scientifi c and optical equip-
ment, semiconductors, and other electronic components. U.S. fi rms had 
no choice but to participate in increasingly globalized markets, either 
by inclusion or exclusion. 
Early signs of the decline of midwestern industrial cities—the rise 
of the Rust Belt—began to appear in the 1960s, as both the concept and 
processes of globalization began to take new root. The word “global-
ize” began to show up in the academic literature in the 1960s and in 
the mainstream press in the 1980s, roughly meaning to make global in 
scope (Liu, Hong, and Liu 2012; Oner et al. 2010; Oswick, Jones and 
Lockwood 2009). Greater numbers of people than ever before started 
to move around the world; more places were involved in the global 
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economy; and fl ows of international goods and investments increased 
signifi cantly. A greater reliance on international markets occurred uni-
versally, except in the communist regimes, and competition increased 
acutely in markets that had been essentially dominated by midwestern 
industry. 
U.S. Socioeconomic Trends
Economic decline beginning in the 1950s in midwestern cities was 
additionally caused by a mix of factors, foremost amongst which may 
have been the widespread preferences of individuals to move to places 
with mild winters, along with increased incomes that made it possible 
to act upon these preferences, and the mass production of affordable air-
conditioning technology (Rappoport 2003). Another major contributor 
was the rapidly changing industrial composition of U.S. employment. 
At the end of World War II, service industries accounted for 10 percent 
of nonfarm employment compared to 38 percent for manufacturing. By 
1996, service industries accounted for 29 percent of nonfarm employ-
ment compared to 15 percent for manufacturing (Meisenheimer 1998). 
The changing composition of industry meant a shift from heavy manu-
facturing of such goods as steel and automobiles, which were concen-
trated in midwestern cities, to service industries, which were freer to 
locate throughout the country. Moreover, the cost of labor in the heavily 
unionized northern and midwestern cities was higher than the cost of 
labor in the largely union-free South and West. These factors played a 
signifi cant role in the massive population migrations that occurred from 
the North and Midwest to the South and West (Greenwood 1997; Hobbs 
and Stoops 2002). To make matters worse for the inner cities, a shift 
occurred in the population of metropolitan areas, from cities to suburbs, 
brought on by widespread adoption of the automobile starting during 
the mid-twentieth century, along with massive investment in highway 
and road construction. As described in Box 1.1, the result of such trends 
can have dire consequences.
Economic Change in China
As the twentieth century came to a close, by far the most signifi -
cant systemic alteration in world markets affecting midwestern indus-
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Box 1.1  Economic Decline in Formerly Preeminent Cities: 
Detroit’s Bankruptcy
On July 18, 2013 the city of Detroit fi led for Chapter 9 bankruptcy 
protection. As the 11th largest city in the U.S., Detroit’s bankruptcy 
stands as a dubious marker in the urban history of a city once considered 
the icon of American industry. While Detroit had been suffering from 
severe fi scal stress since at least 2002 (Scorsone and Bateson 2012), 
the possibility of bankruptcy became all but imminent with the appoint-
ment of Kevyn Orr as Emergency Manager in March 2013.a The city’s 
debt has been estimated to be somewhere between $18 and $20 billion 
(Davey and Walsh 2013), with the city’s pension fund being its larg-
est creditor (Renaud-Komiya 2013). While some pin Detroit’s failures 
squarely on the backs of a corrupt local government that completely 
failed at managing the city’s fi nances (Marotta 2013; Auslin 2013), oth-
ers see the bankruptcy as an outcome of not only this fi nancial misman-
agement, but also a set of multifaceted and complex issues plaguing the 
city for decades, including deindustrialization; globalization; suburban 
sprawl, which reduced the city’s tax base; fi scal stress in the form of 
annual operating defi cits; burdensome health care and pension costs; 
city services stymied by outdated technology and poor service delivery; 
and clear race and class separation between the city and surrounding 
region (Florida 2013; Davey and Walsh 2013). 
As the largest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history, there is keen 
interest in how Detroit will navigate these somewhat uncharted waters—
less than 500 municipalities have sought Chapter 9 protection since its 
inception in the 1930s (U.S. Courts, n.d.). Many municipalities are 
experiencing greater fi scal stress since the Great Recession, and legacy 
costs (i.e., pension and other retiree benefi ts) are of particular concern 
to many midwestern industrial cities as many of these cities face simi-
larly steep contribution requirements (Scorsone and Bateson 2012). In 
a 2012 report that evaluated merits of Chapter 9 bankruptcy for the city 
of Detroit, Scorsone and Bateson (2012) note that the primary advantage 
of bankruptcy is cost containment, specifi cally in regard to reduction of 
legacy costs, as well as improvements in cash fl ow. 
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The impact on residents and the existing assets of the Detroit is also a 
key concern. Both residents and city workers have been assured that city 
services will continue uninterrupted (Davey and Walsh 2013), but cer-
tainly changes lie ahead. Furthermore, although the liquidation of local 
assets is not allowed under Chapter 9, creditors have still requested and 
received appraisals of artwork at the Detroit Institute of Art. Kevyn Orr 
has stated that the sale of artwork was not in the city’s plans (Haskell 
2013). 
Florida (2013) argues that bankruptcy may be the reset Detroit needs 
and that it may help bolster the city’s nascent revitalization efforts by 
stabilizing its fi scal management, spurring greater regional cooperation, 
and highlighting the need for more equitable and inclusive urban revital-
ization models. Thus, many questions remain about Detroit’s fi scal and 
economic future, and both the Rust Belt and the nation will be keenly 
observing its progress through bankruptcy, whether it helps propel the 
city’s revitalization prospects, and the impact on residents, employees, 
and governance structure.
a Fiscal stress “refers to [fi nancial] indicators that merit further attention [and] 
may be indicated by budget shortfalls, decreasing cash balances, or increasing 
debt loads” (Scorsone and Bateson 2012, p. 2). As Emergency Manager, Orr is 
the primary decision-maker and has the power to remove both the Mayor and 
Detroit City Council, through both Orr and local offi cials have been working 
cooperatively to this point.
trial cities was the end of communist economic ideology in China. The 
accession to power of Deng Xiaoping upon the death of Mao Zedong in 
1976 gave rise to the so-called Chinese economic miracle, and changed 
the future of supremacy within the economic world system (Rodriguez 
2011). Whereas previously it had been feasible for a relatively wide 
range of midwestern industries to achieve world-level preeminence, 
the ascendency of China on global markets placed constraints on the 
options for midwestern fi rms. Substantial Chinese penetration began in 
markets that had been virtually the exclusive domain of U.S. manufac-
turing. China’s export bundle increasingly overlapped with that of U.S. 
Box 1.1  (continued)
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production, and did so at progressively low relative prices. In 1972, 
Chinese products were present in only 9 percent of manufacturing prod-
uct categories, but by 2005 they were present in 85 percent (Schott 
2008). With China’s huge and inexpensive labor force, high savings 
rates, and investment in infrastructure, its industry began to pose new 
and daunting levels of competition for the United States and for other 
countries. 
The Chinese economic transformation can generally be explained 
by microeconomic and institutional reforms based on decentralization, 
privatization, and the development of markets (Lin, Cai, and Li 1996), 
and by newly adopted macroeconomic policies favoring openness 
through increased international trade, direct investment, and integration 
into global production networks (Chai 1998; Lardy 2003; Lie, Romilly, 
and Song 1997). In the big picture, the macroeconomic openness side 
probably has had a larger, more direct impact upon midwestern indus-
trial cities. However, the reform side is in some ways more instructive 
for those interested in the renewal of these cities, in that it illustrates 
the tremendous economic power that can be unleashed by the proper 
market incentives for self-initiative and responsibility. 
The reforms were born of the revival of private enterprise follow-
ing massive state spending on industrialization under Mao, along with 
the unimaginable catastrophes brought on by the Great Leap Forward 
in 1957 and the Cultural Revolution in 1966. In the aftermath of Mao’s 
death, confusion over leadership and the control of political power at 
the national level brought opportunities for brave regional governments, 
including the well-known Anhui province in eastern China, to establish 
some elementary private ownership arrangements. There, for the fi rst 
time since the rise of centralized communist economic control, farmers 
were allowed to meet their quotas and to keep excess production to sell 
in markets. This gave farmers the incentives to take risk and to use their 
intelligence to improve agricultural productivity. 
Optimism for a better future grew massively along with the increases 
in agricultural productivity. The gains in productivity in turn stimulated 
the development and diffusion of the township and village enterprises 
in Anhui province and elsewhere. These enterprises produced a wide 
variety of goods and services, such as clothing and other consumer
items. Production decisions began to be made by local actors with 
information about area conditions and markets, rather than by commu-
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nist party chiefs in Beijing. Although these local actors did not at fi rst 
have formal property and ownership rights over their products, they 
continued to follow the established Anhui province model, allowing the 
participants in township and village enterprises to be residual claimants 
on the output of their labor. 
Soon, people all over the country were allowed to act as if they 
were the owners of any products they created in excess of the minimum 
amount set for them by the local leadership. Individuals throughout the 
vast Chinese population were thereby incentivized to produce and to 
begin saving and investing in their land and themselves. The economic 
miracle was thus born of a newfound freedom for the Chinese people to 
respond to market incentives, which created a sense of hope for chang-
ing some of the stagnant economic conditions created by the past mis-
takes of communism. 
Today’s economic world order provides new and daunting chal-
lenges and opportunities in midwestern industrial cities. Looming large 
among these challenges is economic competition by the Chinese, as 
well as by other newly emerging global economic competitors. House-
holds, fi rms, and policymakers within the region will need to recognize 
and to act upon the conditions of the twenty-fi rst century, not those of 
the past period of midwestern industrial dominance. 
MIDWESTERN INDUSTRIAL CITIES WITHIN TODAY’S 
CHANGING ECONOMIC WORLD ORDER
The post–World War II economy was transformed not only by sys-
temic changes in global-level competition but also, especially of late, 
by a combination of population growth and advancements in informa-
tion and communication technologies. Attendant increases in inter-
dependence throughout social systems have brought new diffi culties in 
understanding the substantive aspects of problems such as the renewal 
of prosperity in midwestern industrial cities. Population growth brings 
greater demand for food, shelter, and other resources. Starting with the 
Industrial Revolution in the 1700s, advanced societies have met these 
demands by increasing the intensity and scale of production, leading to 
higher levels of output, driven primarily by fossil fuels. In turn, indus-
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trialization has had major geopolitical, strategic, economic, and social 
implications, some of which bear directly on the prospects for mid-
western industrial cities, and some of which could hamper the ability of 
the United States and its allies to maintain security (Jackson and Howe 
2008).
 To be clear, the United States and indeed the entire world is larger 
than ever before and still growing. At the turn of the twentieth century, 
when midwestern industrial cities were being formed, the population 
of the United States was 76 million and the world population was 1.7 
billion. Today, the U.S. population is 309 million and the world popula-
tion is just over 7 billion. According to midrange projections for 2050, 
the U.S. population will be 400 million (U.S. Census Bureau 2013) 
and the world population will be 9.5 billion (United Nations 2012). All 
the additional people will need food, water, clothing, shelter, and other 
subsistence items. They will want electricity and public infrastructure 
for sewerage and transportation. If and when they become wealthy, 
they will also demand luxury goods, sometimes lots of them. All of this 
requires resources from nature. Thus, these unprecedented population 
sizes pose new risks of resource depletion, problems of resource com-
petition, and increased pressures for interregional trade. Johnson and 
Earle (2000, p. 301) also argue that increased population size almost 
invariably brings greater opportunities and pressures for increasingly 
centralized political and economic control of the means of subsistence, 
largely because of risk management, technological complexity, and 
trade considerations.
Population Growth, Technology, and the Exploitation of Resources
Growth in population has historically been interdependent with 
technological innovation. As populations have continued to increase, 
greater levels of industrial production have been required to meet the 
sustenance needs of households. This has tended to add to the demand 
for agricultural products and for energy and other upstream resources or 
inputs to production. Moreover, the way industry and the market econ-
omy have met this enlarged demand is by fi rst exploiting the easiest-to-
acquire, most immediately available, and therefore least costly resources.
As these readily accessible resources have become depleted, it has 
become increasingly advantageous for industry to turn to less desirable 
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and more costly alternatives. Technological innovation is one of the 
primary strategies with which industry has exploited these options.
Take as an illustration recent efforts to drill for oil in deep water in 
places such as the Gulf of Mexico. Previously the oil and gas industry 
exploited the relatively accessible oil resources located in shallower 
water and closer to land. Prior to the 1990s, most of the oil came from 
shallow water wells, where drilling and production platforms could 
stand on stilts anchored to the sea fl oor. As one would expect given a 
growing population, the demand for oil continued to increase. During 
the 1990s, Global Positioning Systems (GPS) navigation technology 
became available; this made it possible for drilling rigs and ships to 
stay precisely positioned over an oil well using satellite navigation and 
microthrusters. Drilling rigs could thus be located and kept in exact 
position long enough to lay the many miles of pipes required to exploit 
a deepwater oil resource, and without drilling and production platforms 
anchored to the sea fl oor. Deepwater drilling has thus now taken off in 
the Gulf. The easiest-to-acquire, immediately available, and least-costly 
oil resources have been largely depleted, and new technologies have 
made it possible to exploit previously ignored or inaccessible ones.
New technologies have enabled more people in more households 
to meet their sustenance needs and to enjoy their luxury goods. Fur-
ther advancements in technology have made it possible for industry to 
exploit additional resources, facilitating increased population growth, 
which has posed problems that require more technological innovation, 
allowing even less accessible resources to be utilized. According to 
More (2000), this sort of positive feedback loop between population 
growth and technological innovation has allowed industrialization to 
continue to meet the sustenance needs of growing populations since 
the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. Johnson and Earle (2000, 
p. 29) argue that this has been a general tendency in human societies 
throughout history, leading to an “upward spiral” of political-economic 
integration and more powerful leaders.  
The combination of population growth and technological advance-
ment has changed the international calculus of production, consump-
tion, and competition in a way that is unlikely to reverse itself in the life-
time of anyone alive today, and it has brought new forms of risk. Take, 
for instance, products that come from rare earth elements, upstream 
resources used, among other things, in automobile production, petro-
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leum refi ning, fl at panel displays in cell phones, portable digital ver-
satile discs (DVDs) and laptops, magnets, batteries, generators, medi-
cal devices, jet fi ghter engines, missile guidance systems, antimissile 
defense, and space-based satellites and communication systems. The 
United States used to be self-reliant in domestically produced rare earth 
elements, but over the past 15 years it has become 100 percent reliant 
on imports, primarily from China, largely because of lower-cost opera-
tions there (Humphries 2012).3 
Dependence on upstream resources from foreign countries entails 
potentially enormous economic and political vulnerabilities. Factors 
such as distant natural hazards and accidents, as well as possibly hostile 
foreign political and economic decision makers who control upstream 
resources, threaten the stability of the production processes upon which 
the well-being of segments of local populations depend. Insofar as 
global markets function properly, and no hostilities arise, markets will 
continue to solve some of these risk problems effi ciently. However, the 
integration of local production processes into global markets means a 
loss of local security for the affected fi rms and households.  
The Need for Innovation and Entrepreneurship
As long as the U.S. and world populations continue to grow, demand 
will continue to increase for new technologies that enable improve-
ments in the effi ciency and effectiveness with which previously inac-
cessible resources can be utilized. The newly accessible resources will 
in turn enable increasing population growth, with its attendant increases 
in industrial specialization and trade. This is one big reason why inno-
vation and entrepreneurship really matter. Regardless of whether the 
populations of midwestern industrial cities grow, remain stable, or 
shrink, rising national and world populations will put greater demand 
on resources and cause increased competition in markets. Households 
and fi rms in these cities can innovate, bring new goods and services to 
market, and either successfully compete in these markets or be excluded 
from them. Alternatively, households or fi rms can migrate in search of 
a better set of circumstances, as many have done over the past few 
decades. 
Innovation, which is arguably the most desirable prospect for fi rms 
and the households that depend on them, can be seen in the central 
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Ohio automotive cluster, which has been able to maintain a competi-
tive advantage over alternative locations that might offer better labor 
or input costs by focusing on high-value-added manufacturing. As Hill, 
Samuel, and Stewart (2008) explain: 
The traditional ways in which manufacturers have tried to add 
value to products have been to offer better quality, lower cost or 
more speed or dependability in meeting just-in-time demands. 
These factors have become business necessities: Delivery reliabil-
ity, quality and cost are now standard. The new value opportunities 
lie in customer experience, supply risk, and product and process 
innovation. The quality of the business relationship, the support 
for innovation, and the drive to minimize supply risk perhaps best 
explain why some OEMS [original equipment manufacturers] are 
succeeding and others are struggling. New domestics like Honda 
of America Manufacturing [located in central OH] tend to nurture 
a close relationship with their chosen suppliers, even providing 
access to the production lines in order to improve not only product 
but process. Tier 1 suppliers spoke favorably of customer com-
panies that exhibited willingness to work with them on product 
development and pricing. This kind of close relationship has real 
economic benefi t in that it helps reduce risk and spur innovation.
(pp. 12–13)
Technology has always been a driving force for economic change, 
and Freeman (1989) classifi es the latest shifts attributable to informa-
tion and communication as the fourth major technological revolution. 
This fourth phase adds to the textile innovations of the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, railroads in the mid to late nineteenth 
century, and electricity as well as the internal combustion engine dur-
ing the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The most recent 
transition has accelerated the development of international markets and 
powerful multinational and global corporations, and has fostered a new 
economic climate that features the rise of the service sector, the loss of 
prominence for manufacturing, and widespread consumerism.
Castells (1996) notes that this latest movement has been multidi-
mensional in nature, but that a new paradigm rooted in major advance-
ments within information and communication technologies lies at its 
heart. These technological improvements have vastly increased the 
integration of the existing world economy and created a new global-
ized economy. While the previous international economy experienced 
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capital accumulation that fl owed between countries, the new global-
ized economy differs in that its “core components have the institutional, 
organizational, and technological capacity to work as a unit in real time, 
or in chosen time, on a planetary scale” (p. 102). 
The process of industrial globalization is characterized by connec-
tions within national markets via consumers, production processes, and 
the expansion of market competition (Wiersema and Bowen 2008). In 
turn, consumers and the productive activities of fi rms are linked through 
globalized industries, which make products and services ever more stan-
dardized through increasingly homogenized consumer preferences and 
global economies of scale in both manufacturing and research and devel-
opment (Wiersema and Bowen 2008). During the latter half of the twen-
tieth century, globalization was also aided by government policies favor-
ing deregulation and free market principles (Castells 2000; Singh 1994); 
reduced trade barriers and costs of international transportation and com-
munications (Hummels, Ishii, and Yi 1999; Krueger 1995); increased 
integration of global capital markets (Sachs et al. 1995); greater capital 
mobility and reduced transaction costs; and a larger number of fi nancial 
instruments (Irwin 1996). All of these changes have unalterably affected 
the markets within which midwestern industries must compete. 
The Outcomes of Globalization
By the 1990s, many developing countries had been brought into the 
world economy, with increases in foreign direct investment, technol-
ogy transfer, and production effi ciencies (McMillan and Rodrik 2011). 
This world market has, among other things, resulted in the breakdown 
of the traditional, vertically integrated “Fordist” production process, 
which formed the core of the U.S. manufacturing sector in the middle of 
the twentieth century (Feenstra 1998), and in the growth of specializa-
tion by individual countries on certain phases of production (Hummels, 
Ishii, and Yi 1999). The outcomes of globalization have also included 
increased levels of regional, national, and global competition (Wiersema 
and Bowen 2008), cross-border mergers and acquisitions (UNCTAD 
1987–1999), and the growth of multinational fi rms (Wiersema and 
Bowen 2008). Collectively, these outcomes have negatively impacted 
the economies of midwestern industrial cities, partially by increasing 
competition in product markets, and partially by concentrating the cen-
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ters of fi nancial control in fewer and fewer world cities, exacerbating 
the decline that began during the 1960s and 1970s. Integration of the 
developing countries into the world economy all but guarantees that the 
population and productive output of the United States in general, and 
of midwestern industrial cities in particular, will continue to steadily
shrink as a share of the world’s total (Jackson and Howe 2008).4
Newly structured global-scale corporations have seized upon 
before-unseen economies of scale in production, distribution, market-
ing, and management, giving way to a new level of world consumerism 
that was a death knell for many previously thriving midwestern fi rms 
that did not or could not operate on this scale (Levitt 1983). The global 
corporation is a more advanced entity than the multinational corpora-
tion, and one that “operates with resolute consistency—at a low relative 
cost—as if the entire world (or major regions of it) were a single entity; 
it sells the same things in the same way everywhere” (Levitt 1983, p. 
92). While global competition has forced U.S. fi rms to be more produc-
tive and effi cient (Hill, Samuel, and Stewart 2008), these benefi ts have 
not come without high costs, including stagnating wage rates (Law-
rence and Slaughter 1993) and lost manufacturing jobs (Levitt 1983), 
which contributed to the decline of cities and regions that were once 
industrial powerhouses, such as those in the Midwest.  
The “new economy” that had more or less fully emerged by the 
1990s was integrated as never before in history at a global scale. It 
was rooted in global knowledge and ideas, with wealth and job creation 
tied to innovation and technology in all sectors of the economy (Acs, 
de Groot, and Nijkamp 2002; Atkinson and Gottlieb 2001). Electricity 
and the electrical engine helped bolster the industrial-based economy 
that allowed cities such as Cleveland and Detroit to prosper during 
the early and middle decades of the twentieth century. Similarly, the 
new knowledge-centric economy has been driven by microelectronics, 
computing, and digital communication advancements, including the 
Internet and extensive software developments, which have spurred the 
growth of places like Silicon Valley and the Research Triangle (Castells 
1996). The infrastructure and transportation linkages that created com-
parative advantages for many midwestern cities during the early part of 
the twentieth century were crucial to the success of their manufactur-
ing industries. But these linkages were less important to burgeoning 
knowledge-intensive industries that rely heavily on human capital to 
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create a competitive advantage, and that are are primarily service- rather 
than production-oriented while competing at a global scale. 
Another major component of this “new economy” was the momen-
tous shift from manufacturing to the service sector, leading to a new 
industrial structure for many regions within the United States. The 
demise of the global dominance of the U.S. manufacturing sector began 
in the late twentieth century, during a period when developing countries 
experienced signifi cant gains in technical skills and closed education 
gaps that previously existed with other nations, particularly in industrial 
and engineering fi elds; this was accomplished by developing infrastruc-
ture within universities, technical institutions, and vocational training 
schools (Singh 1994). These knowledge and infrastructure gains, cou-
pled with rapid capital mobility, allowed U.S. manufacturing fi rms to 
exploit the regulatory, trade, wage, and environmental policies present 
within many developing countries by either relocating there or subcon-
tracting through fi rms within those areas (Feenstra 1998). Furthermore, 
changes from recent technological innovations also directly affected 
the operations of the manufacturing sector through the expansion of 
new products, reduced costs, a reorganization of fi rms and industries, 
improved structure and effi ciencies of large factories and fi rms, changes 
in production systems, fl exible specialization, and the introduction of 
just-in-time production (Singh 1994).
The multidimensional forces of globalization that propelled a shift 
in industrial structure for many regions within the United States also 
helped to trigger a new, heavily bifurcated occupational structure, com-
posed of higher-wage information technology jobs and lower-wage 
service sector occupations, and the decline of mid-wage, blue-collar 
manufacturing positions. A steady drop in both plant and fi rm sizes was 
seen in manufacturing throughout the United States and other western 
industrialized nations, which resulted from a combination of reduced 
noncore business activities and new computer-based technologies that 
improved productivity (Carlsson 1989). 
The transition we have described means a larger-scale, more 
integrated, technologically intensive, knowledge-based, and service-
oriented world economic order. As the infl uence of China, and to a 
lesser degree India and Brazil, continues to grow, the U.S. economic 
system in general, and the midwestern economic systems in particular, 
will surely play a less dominant role on the world stage. But we do not 
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see this as a cause for alarm. There is no convincing evidence that the 
inhabitants of cities with greater economic dominance in world markets 
fare better than residents in cities with lesser dominance.5 Goals, objec-
tives, and policies oriented toward improved quality of life for residents 
rather than attainment or reattainment of economic dominance appear 
to offer greater promise for the future of midwestern industrial cities. 
NEW STRATEGIES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
FOR PROSPERITY
 In general terms, the global economic transition is driven by popu-
lation growth together with technological progress, but in its details it 
is complex beyond human understanding. The transition is inseparable 
from the myriad of day-to-day decisions by unimaginably large numbers 
of individuals throughout the economic world order. The disconcert-
ing and sometimes frustrating experience of uncertainty in the face of 
change felt within midwestern industrial cities is no doubt exacerbated 
by the belief that these cities will not in the twenty-fi rst century regain 
the world-level preeminence they enjoyed in the twentieth century. 
As a consequence, a sense of social and economic crisis and bewil-
derment is common today in many midwestern industrial cities and 
elsewhere. Within these places, there is a widespread perception of loss 
of past prosperity and a diminished feeling of well-being. A frequently 
shared view is that things used to be better, and public policies and pro-
grams must be devised and implemented to restore previous levels of 
affl uence. Yet there is little agreement on what specifi c actions should 
be taken to this end. Public policy proposals differ vastly, not only in 
terms of what actions should be taken, but also who should initiate and 
take responsibility for them, and who should pay for them. Moreover, 
efforts to sort through and interpret the multitudes of inconsistent and at 
times even contradictory facts, rules, norms, and interests served by any 
given proposal tend to leave people frustrated, sometimes even those of 
us who have dedicated our work lives to studying cities and public poli-
cies. We are presented with a predicament in which we encounter con-
ceptualizations and relationships among multiple interdependent vari-
ables, all of which are necessary to think coherently about the renewal 
up14wbrttrch2.indd   24 1/10/2014   10:04:08 AM
Midwestern Urban and Regional Responses   25
of prosperity in these cities, but which when taken together exceed our 
unaided mental powers to meaningfully evaluate. 
This book is predicated on the perspective that while midwestern 
industrial cities will not remain globally preeminent, they need not 
necessarily continue to experience diminished prosperity. Although the 
time and circumstances since the heyday of midwestern industrial dom-
ination have changed and sociotechnical systems have become larger 
scale and more complex, the foundations of renewed prosperity may 
stem today, much as they always have, from a vibrant market economy. 
Capitalistic markets are a central phenomenon of modern life. They, 
and the institutional frameworks that enable and sustain them, such as 
the U.S. Constitution, are arguably more than a little responsible for the 
initial rise of prosperity in industrial cities in the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries.
The Importance of the Market 
Capitalistic markets are in no small measure the cause of wealth and 
productivity increases and are the vehicle that has made a much broader 
array of goods and services accessible to many more people than ever 
before. Capitalistic markets and their institutional frameworks have 
been the source of technological advancements, a previously unimagi-
nable range of choice of occupation and lifestyle, and unprecedented 
levels of happiness and well-being enjoyed by a relatively large per-
centage of the population today (Stevenson and Wolfers 2008, Nelson 
1990, Ridley 2010). Perhaps most importantly, these markets, together 
with their enabling institutions, have arguably given rise to unprece-
dented access to more and better information. Consequently, examina-
tion of these markets, their institutional frameworks, and their effects 
on prosperity from various political and disciplinary perspectives (and 
from perspectives that transcend normal disciplinary boundaries) is too 
important to be left only to economists and public policymakers, largely 
because they involve a great deal more than what we typically think of 
as “economic” and “political” issues.
Of course, not everyone has confi dence that unfettered markets and 
free institutions alone can or will renew prosperity in today’s midwest-
ern industrial cities, especially without exacerbating other problems, 
such as distributional inequities between class and race. Indeed, the 
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concept of a capitalist market is merely a model or abstraction from 
reality that helps us to represent and grasp some key elements of our 
societies and their relationships to one another. Moreover, this model 
may not be an altogether adequate one. It neglects to consider a range 
of political and social realities that depart from premises of consumer 
choice and decentralized decision making. For instance, it does not pro-
vide guidance on how and when societies should regulate monopolies 
or provide infrastructure. It tends to come up short as to how or when 
societies should respond to problems of extreme income inequality and 
inequity. It provides no reason to have compassion for fi rms that go 
under or for individual households that have been placed at risk for 
homelessness and unemployment as a result of market effi ciencies. 
The ideal type of capitalistic market makes certain assumptions 
about private property, exchange between legally free individuals, and 
the production and distribution of goods and services through mutual 
understandings and agreements between transacting parties to market 
transactions. The assumptions about private property, in turn, presup-
pose the existence of governmental authority to design and establish 
laws and property rights, and police power for the enforcement of those 
laws and rights. The assumptions about exchange between legally free 
individuals presuppose that people possess certain rights that meaning-
fully distinguish them from serfs or slaves, and that labor is not forcibly 
extracted from them through the exercise of superior political author-
ity or power. The assumptions about the production and distribution of 
goods presuppose that decisions to exchange are not made by custom 
or through the coercive use of power by any sort of centralized author-
ity. In turn, all of these assumptions are open to question, if in no other 
way than in their applicability in any given situation or set of situations, 
including the renewal of prosperity in midwestern industrial cities. 
The Role of Public Policy
Nevertheless, some suppositions must always be made prior to any 
systematic examination of a phenomenon. In this book, the assumption 
throughout all of the individual contributions is that while capitalistic 
markets provide the only tried and tested method of achieving pros-
perity, they have certain imperfections for which public policies are 
at times necessary. Furthermore, all of the contributions are consistent 
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with the following propositions: that augmented production (rather than 
consumption) and exchange of goods and services within the context of 
free institutions offer the best long-term solution to the social and eco-
nomic problems of Rust Belt regions;6 that the development of renewed 
productive capacity in these regions will in the fi rst instance require 
up-front investments of time, attention and energy, and in the second 
instance fi nancial capital; that many of the most important resources 
and factors in the production of capital goods are not and will never be 
completely mobile with respect to space and time; and that therefore net 
increases in regional prosperity necessitate urban institutions, public 
policies, practices, and cultures willing and able to divert into enhanced 
production input resources that would otherwise go to goods and ser-
vices that are immediately consumed.
All of the contributions assume confi dence in public policies and 
institutions supportive of innovation, entrepreneurship, specialization, 
and trade as the best route to renewed regional prosperity. But just as 
markets have certain limitations, so do public policies. Not all public 
policies are conducive to renewed prosperity; indeed, as the following 
chapters discuss, even some of those public policies advocated in terms 
of their positive effects on midwestern regional economic development 
may do more harm than good. 
We hope that the chapters in this book can avoid getting narrowly 
associated with labels such as “conservative” or “liberal.” The focus is 
on how older industrial regional systems really work and what can and 
should be (and what cannot and should not be) done through both public 
institutions and private markets in efforts to improve their performance. 
How might urban policy be used to renew and update capitalist markets 
so as to put old industrial regions back on the road to prosperity? What 
mix of market versus nonmarket allocation mechanisms is optimal? 
How can and do free people in such regions, living in democratic capi-
talist systems, solve problems to meet the needs and wants of others, so 
as to turn their perceptions of scarcity and loss into ones of abundance? 
Reframing Prosperity 
When thinking of prosperous places, we may invoke images that 
translate to a high quality of life and living standards, such as vibrant 
artistic, musical, and literary communities; entertainment districts with 
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a relatively high number of restaurants, bars, and cultural institutions; 
an environment with great parks, green spaces, and recreational activi-
ties; accessible, convenient, and affordable transportation; good schools 
and universities; and low rates of poverty, with high levels of employ-
ment. This is not an exhaustive list, nor are these characteristics only 
found in places such as New York, Chicago, or Los Angeles.  
It seems to us that an important component of prosperity centers 
on reframing this concept. The economic dominance that was previ-
ously associated with many midwestern industrial cities is unlikely to 
reemerge, especially in light of the previously discussed transitions and 
the infl uence of growing economies such as China and India. How-
ever, it is important to note that prosperity need not be exclusively tied 
with economic dominance. Rather, the idea of a prosperous city is that 
most if not all of the people who live in it have good lives. In the spirit 
of Amartya Sen (1999), the people in a prosperous city have the free-
dom to live the kinds of lives they value. They see themselves as active 
participants in shaping their own futures and by taking initiative and 
accepting the responsibility for themselves and their actions, they have 
the opportunity to better themselves and the prospects faced by their 
children. There are numerous examples of urban and regional econo-
mies that have attained high levels of prosperity without economic pre-
eminence, and there is an abundance of knowledge available to help 
to turn the problems currently facing midwestern industrial cities into 
opportunities. This book is all about such knowledge.
The concept of prosperity, which is traditionally linked to wealth 
and measured in terms of income, unemployment, and poverty rates, 
may be meaningfully and fruitfully reexamined with a more compre-
hensive approach, one that deemphasizes consumptive aspects and 
focuses on productive ones, as well as on the social, psychological, and 
health-related components (Bergmann 2010; Fodor 2001, 2012; Hamil-
ton 2003; Jackson 2009; Sen 1999). In particular, the emerging policies 
and practices of smart decline and right-sizing are working to address 
the unique realities facing formerly dominant industrial cities, which 
include planning for fewer people, buildings, and land uses, as well as 
better aligning physical landscapes to meet the needs of future popula-
tions (Hollander 2011; Popper and Popper 2002; Schilling and Logan 
2008). Furthermore, there is evidence that slower-growing metropoli-
tan statistical areas (MSAs), in terms of population, outperform higher-
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growth MSAs on many measures of prosperity, including income and 
poverty rates (Fodor 2012). 
Within the realm of midwestern industrial cities, achieving pros-
perity will require the leadership within cities and regions to broaden 
their focus from past models targeted at economic dominance and heav-
ily focused on short-term economic development strategies. While the 
consideration of short-term strategies inclusive of business attraction, 
retention, and expansion is warranted, these transactions need to be 
linked to strengthening and improving the assets within the region’s 
larger portfolio of products, businesses, and people.7 Past actions of the 
leadership within many cities and regions have tended to be based on the 
overriding importance and inevitability of increasing globalization and 
the argument that, to be competitive in world markets, cities must com-
pete for footloose industry not tied to any particular location or country, 
which can relocate in response to local economic conditions. Striving 
to succeed in globally competitive markets at all costs has proved less 
than successful for many places and has served to intensify levels of 
inequality among cities and among social strata within cities. Many 
of the economic development strategies adopted in efforts to compete 
for footloose investment tend to be short-term in nature and to focus 
on immediate needs as well as politically marketable achievements, 
such as job creation and growth of tax bases. While these approaches 
may produce some desired outcomes, they fail to address the longer-
term components of a comprehensive economic development strategy, 
which moves beyond selling the existing assets of a region and toward 
improving, strengthening, and changing assets for long-term prosperity. 
This book is predicated upon the assumption that renewed prosper-
ity is feasible in midwestern industrial cities if (and only if) good deci-
sions are made within them by individuals with infl uence in both the 
public and private sectors. Moreover, restructured public policy, espe-
cially microeconomic policy, is essential, as well as increased levels of 
international business exchange, especially with the Chinese. 
The Industrial Revolution changed the economic world order by 
giving prominence to cities, regions, and nations that could adapt their 
governance structures and the organizational processes through which 
they made collective choices toward the power of free markets and pri-
vate, personal industry, and innovation. By empowering the individu-
als within local economic systems, the Industrial Revolution empow-
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ered the cities, regions, and nations it affected. It led to a system in 
which nothing will improve the fortunes of fi rms and individuals more 
effectively and effi ciently than public and private sector decisions that 
increase production of the goods and services people value and the 
exchange of such goods and services in free and competitive markets. 
This is as true for midwestern industrial cities today as it was during 
their inception, as it was for Chinese cities during their recent economic 
miracle, and as it is for cities throughout the global economic system.
Notes
 1. Measured in constant 2005 dollars (http://www.measuringworth.com/datasets/
usgdp/result.php). 
 2. GATT later became the World Trade Organization (WTO), which today sets the 
ground rules for international commerce.
 3. Such considerations have recently given rise to the President’s National Stra-
tegy for Global Supply Chain Security (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press
-offi ce/2012/01/25/fact-sheet-national-strategy-global-supply-chain-security).
 4. The rate of growth of the U.S. population, along with the rates of growth of other 
advanced industrial nations such as Japan and Germany, is slowing down some-
what relative to the rate of growth of the world population overall. Partially this 
relative shrinkage is attributable to the high growth rates in Africa and India. Par-
tially it is also attributable to fertility declines that have historically been found to 
go hand in hand with the development of wealthy and advanced industrial econ-
omies (Guinnane 2011). Various theories of fertility decline have been brought 
forward to explain population growth rate declines, including ones that attribute 
them to factors such as the availability of contraceptives, women’s decisions to 
postpone childbirth, the relatively high cost of raising children in advanced indus-
trial economies, and more women choosing to remain in the workforce rather 
than have children (Becker, Murphy, and Tamura 1990; Bryant 2007; Galor 2012; 
Guinnane 2011).
 5. Indeed, the “global-city hypothesis” (Friedmann 1986) asserts that the most eco-
nomically dominant cities are especially prone to extremes of inequality.
 6. For a thoughtful, stimulating, and informative argument that far from being the 
path to prosperity, society’s orientation toward consumption is at the heart of our 
social ills, see Hamilton (2003). 
 7. This conceptualization of a regional economic development framework stems 
from multiple lectures and discussions with Ned Hill.
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